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Abstract
This paper examines the optimal non linear income and commodity tax when the
same labor disutility can receive two alternative interpretations, taste for leisure and
disability, but the disability is not readily observable. We compare the optimal policy
under alternative social objectives, welfarist and non-welfarist, and conclude that the
non-welfarist objective, in which the planner gives a higher weight to the disutility of
labour of the disabled individuals, is the only reasonable specification. It has some
foundation in the theory of responsability; further, unlike the other specifications it
yields an optimal solution that may involve a lower labour supply requirement from
disabled individuals.
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1 Introduction
In a couple of papers [Marchand et al. (2003), Cremer et al. (2006)] the point was
made that there are two ways of interpreting the disutility of labor in the standard
optimal income taxation model. Either it represents some taste for leisure or it reflects
the physical or psychological pain from work. In other words, in a two-good framework
(disposable income and labor) the same utility function can represent the preferences
of two different individuals: a leisure-prone one and a disabled one. If this is the case,
a social planner who wants to distinguish them, more precisely discriminate in favor
of the disabled, might be unable to do so in a setting of asymmetric information. In
Marchand et al. (2003) the way out was to introduce a vector of consumption goods
and posit that the two types of individuals behave differently towards some particular
goods such as leisure goods or health-related goods. In Cremer et al. (2006) an audit
technology was introduced allowing to sort out the two kinds of aversion to effort.
The fundamental question one faces with this issue of indistinguishability is what
welfare criterion to use. More specifically, should one use a welfarist approach giving
more weight to the disabled individuals or should one use a "paternalistic" non-welfarist
approach? In this paper we argue that the correct approach is the second one and that
it can be justified on the basis of the distinction made by Roemer (1998) between
responsibility and luck.
Accordingly, individuals’ outcomes may differ due partly to choice and partly to
circumstances beyond their control, or luck. Roemer’s view is that we should correct
for differences across individuals that are a matter of luck, while preserving differences
for which individuals are responsible. Two difficulties generally arise at this point. First,
what is luck and what is responsibility? Second, how practically distinguish them? We
will follow Roemer’s approach and consider poor health as the result of bad luck and
taste for leisure as the result of deliberate choice. Further, in order to take into account
differences in health and ignore differences in taste for leisure in the social criterion, we
will use an average parameter for the latter.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we examine
the non-welfarist approach, whereas in section 3 we present the welfarist approach,
including the Rawlsian criterion as an extreme case, and we show why it does not
provide desirable results. A final section concludes.
2 Non-welfarist approach
Let us consider a particular separable type of Mirrlees’ utility function:
u (x, c) = u (x)− αh (c) (1)
where u (·) and h (·) are continuous, differentiable, strictly increasing and, respectively,
concave and convex. x is disposable income, c is labor supply and α is a parameter
measuring the intensity of labor disutility. We can interpret αh (c) in two different ways.
It can be viewed as measuring the physical or psychological hardship from working c
hours, or as the utility the individual gets from enjoying
¡
c− c
¢
hours of leisure, c
being the total available time. One could encompass these two aspects by rewriting the
utility function as:
u (x, c) = u (x) + ϕL
¡
c− c
¢
− ϕH (c)
where ϕL (·) is the utility of leisure and ϕH (·) the disutility of effort. A particular form
of this function could be:
u (x, c) = u (x)− (αL + αH)h (c)
where αL is the leisure parameter and αH the health parameter. From this expression, it
is clear that two individuals can have the same α = αL+αH but different combinations
of αL and αH .
Following Roemer (1998) we treat αL as a choice variable and αH as a variable
stemming from luck. Consider first two types of individuals who have the same α, but
different combinations of αL and αH . Type 1 is said to be disabled with a high α1H ,
relative to α1L, and type 2 is said to be leisure-prone with a high α
2
L, relative to α
2
H .
2
In their individual choice of c both will use the same utility function (1). However
the social planner may decide to take into account the difference in αH but to ignore
the difference in αL, choosing to employ the same value of αL for everyone, e.g. α2L.
As a consequence, the objective function of the social planner would be:
n1
£
u (c1)−
¡
α1H + α
2
L
¢
h (c1)
¤
+ n2
£
u (c2)−
¡
α2H + α
2
L
¢
h (c2)
¤
(2)
where n1 and n2 are the relative number of types 1 and 2. Without loss of generality
we can normalize these parameters such that α1H+α
2
L = β1 > 1 and α
2
H+α
2
L = β2 = 1.
The table below explains our normalization.
Taste for leisure Disutility of effort Aggregate value for
Type the individuals the social planner
1 2−β β − 1 1 β > 1
2 1 0 1 1
So doing we clearly adopt a non-Paretian approach, which is at odds with the view
of Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2005a,b) but not of Bossert and Van de Gaer (1999) or
Schokkaert et al. (2004). These authors deal with the distinction between responsibility
and luck by using a paternalistic view for the valuations of leisure.
This approach is also close to that used in behavioral economics when the social
planner does not use, in its objective function, individual preferences but its own pref-
erences for e.g. sin goods.1
Following Marchand et al. (2003) we consider also a third type of individual with
higher productivity than types 1 and 2 but the same combination of αL and αH as
type 2. The society consists then of three types of individuals: disabled and able low-
productivity individuals, and high-productivity able individuals. We denote them by
1, 2 and 3, respectively. The crucial point is that the three types have the same formal
labor disutility α but type 1 has a relatively higher αH and, according to (2), the social
planner attaches a higher weight to her labor disutility.
In addition, we consider the case where disabled and able individuals may use their
disposable income, which was denoted above by x, in different ways. In order to capture
this idea, we use the following utility function:
Ui = ci + v
¡
di − di
¢
− h (ci) i = 1, 2, 3, (3)
1O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003) and Kanbur et al. (2006).
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where ci and di represents two types of consumption goods. di is a good for which
disabled individuals have relatively higher needs (like health care). Accordingly, we
posit d1 = d > d2 = d3 = 0. The utility function is quasi-linear (linear in consumption
ci), v (·) and h (·) are continuous, differentiable and strictly increasing functions. v (·)
is strictly concave and h (·) is strictly convex.2
In a market economy, each individual maximizes:
Ui = (wi ci − di) + v
¡
di − di
¢
− h (ci) ,
where constant per-unit costs of production are assumed with one unit of effective labor
being necessary to produce one unit of either good. wi represents the productivity of
individual i, where w1 = w2 = wc and w3 = wh, with wh > wc The disposable income
yi = wi ci is devoted to consumption of goods ci and di. Clearly, c1 = c2 < c3,
d1− d = d2 = d3 (hence, d1 > d2 = d3) and c1 < c2 < c3, where c1 = c2− d. Note that,
in terms of income, y1 = y2 < y3. That is, both disabled and able low-productivity
individuals work and earn the same. The only difference is that they use their disposable
income differently. Since disabled individuals have higher needs of commodity d, they
enjoy lower consumption of commodity c than able ones. This may seem unfair and
may provide some role for redistribution from able to disabled individuals.
As a benchmark let us look at the first-best solution. Given the quasi-linearity of
individual utilities, we use a strictly concave social utility transformation G (·) that
reflects aversion towards inequality. As just discussed the social planner acknowledges
that the labor disutility of disabled individuals (i.e., type 1) does not have the same
social cost as the labor disutility of the two other types and, accordingly, the labor
disutility of disabled individuals is weighted more heavily in the social welfare function
than that of able ones.
The problem of the planner is expressed now by the following Lagrangian:
£ =
3X
i=1
ni
£
G
¡
ci + v
¡
di − di
¢
− βih (ci)
¢
+ λ (wi ci − ci − di)
¤
,
where ni is the relative number of individuals of type i, and βi is the weight attached
to the labor disutility of individuals of type i, with β1 = β > 1 = β2 = β3. In what
2We choose a quasi-linear (linear in c) specification for simplicity. The qualitative results presented
in the paper concerning the desirability of the non-welfarist approach over the welfarist approach in a
SB setting with asymmetric information extend to a more general separable utility function.
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follows, we will denote the argument of G by eUi, which differs from Ui when the weight
βi differs from 1.
The first order conditions (hereafter FOCs) yield:
G0
³eUi´ = λ and thus eU1 = U2 = U3;
v0
¡
d1 − d
¢
= v0 (d2) = v0 (d3) = 1 and thus d1 − d = d2 = d3;
β
h0 (c1)
wc
=
h0 (c2)
wc
=
h0 (c3)
wh
and thus c1 < c2 < c3.
In contrast to the laissez-faire, disabled individuals work less than able ones. This
follows from the fact that the planner attaches more weight to their disutility of labor.
To achieve the first-best solution perfect observability of individuals’ characteristics
is required. We now consider a second-best setting where the planner is able to observe
consumption levels of ci and di (although not needs d¯i), together with labor earnings
yi (that is, yi = wi ci, but not wi and ci separately). As usual, we express the utility
function in terms of the variables the planer is able to observe (i.e., ci, di and yi):3
Ui (ci, di, yi) = ci + v
¡
di − d¯i
¢
− h
µ
yi
wi
¶
.
The first-best solution is no longer feasible because high-productivity individuals have
incentives to mimic both low-productivity ones and, among low-productivity individu-
als, able individuals have incentives to mimic disabled ones.
In the second-best setting the social planner needs to take into account self-selection
constraints (hereafter SSCs) in order to prevent individuals of a given type from apply-
ing for the tax-treatment designed for individuals of other types. Appendix A identifies
the SSCs that need to be incorporated in the present framework. The second-best
problem is then:
max
{ci,di,yi}
3X
i=1
niG
·
ci + v
¡
di − d¯i
¢
− βih
µ
yi
wi
¶¸
3This is standard use. In the second-best framework it is convenient to express the problem in terms
of the variables the social planner can observe (see Stiglitz (1982)).
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s.t.
(µ) :
3X
i=1
ni (yi − ci − di) ≥ 0
(λi) : ci + v (di)− h
µ
yi
wi
¶
≥ ci−1 + v (di−1)− h
µ
yi−1
wi
¶
, i = 2, 3
(λ31) : c3 + v (d3)− h
µ
y3
wh
¶
≥ c1 + v (d1)− h
µ
y1
wh
¶
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint, λi (for i =
3, 2) stand for the Lagrange multipliers associated with the adjacent downwards SSCs,
namely 3 mimicking 2 and 2 mimicking 1, and λ31 is the Lagrange multiplier associated
with the non-adjacent downwards SSC, namely 3 mimicking 1.
Rearranging the FOCs, given by equations (B.1.1) to (B.1.9) in appendix B, yields:
v0 (d3) = h0
µ
y3
wh
¶
1
wh
= 1, (4)
v0 (d2) =
λn2
n2G02 + λ2 − λ3
= 1, (5)
h0
µ
y2
wc
¶
= wc
·
1− λ3
n2G02 + λ2
µ
1− h0
µ
y2
wh
¶
1
wh
¶¸
≤ wc, (6)
v0
¡
d1 − d¯1
¢
− 1 = λ2 + λ31
n1G01
¡
v0 (d1)− 1
¢
, (7)
h0
µ
y1
wc
¶
= wc

1−
n1G01 (β − 1) + λ31
³
1− h0
³
y1
wh
´
1
wh
´
βn1G01 − λ2

 < wc, (8)
µ =
3P
i=1niG
0
i
³eUi´
3P
i=1ni
. (9)
The second-best levels of y3, d3 and d2 coincide with the first-best ones. There is no
efficiency gain in distorting the choices of the high-productivity individuals, nor the
choice of commodity d by the low-productivity able individuals. There is an efficiency
gain in distorting the labor supply decision of type 2 individuals if by doing so we
prevent high-productivity individual from mimicking them. It can indeed be shown that
the SSC that prevents type 3 from mimicking type 2 individuals binds, and ySB2 < y
FB
2 .
In addition, d1 is higher and c1 is smaller than in the first-best. It is optimal to distort
the choice of commodity d of disabled individuals, so that they consume more than in
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the first-best, and there are now two reasons why disabled individuals may be induced to
work less: on the one hand, there is the concern of the planner for the labor disutility
of this particular type (i.e., β > 1); on the other, it might be necessary to prevent
high-productivity individuals from mimicking them.
The relationship between y1 and y2 (and, thus, between c1 and c2) is in principle
ambiguous. A further analysis of the pattern of binding SSCs - see appendix B.1 for
more detail - yields the following results. The three SSCs can only be simultaneously
binding if ySB1 = y
SB
2 < y
FB
2 = y
FB
1 . If the SSCs that prevent high-productivity
individuals from mimicking both low-productivity ones are binding, then it is possible
that the downwards SSC that relates both low-productivity individuals holds with
strict inequality if yFB1 > y
SB
1 > y
SB
2 . If the adjacent downwards SSCs are binding,
then it is possible that the non-adjacent downwards SSC holds with strict inequality if
ySB2 > y
SB
1 . This last result seems particularly fair because the social planner wants
the disabled individuals to work less than the able ones.4 It can be shown that if d¯1 is
sufficiently high and β sufficiently different from 1, the vector (c1, d1, y1) that is not to
be mimicked by type 2 individuals will include y1 < y2. This is pretty intuitive.
As it is standard, the optimal allocation resulting from solving the above problems
can be decentralized by means of tax/subsidy schedules. We have so far presented the
problem as if the planner confronted the individual with a choice of three bundles. Each
bundle is composed by three terms: consumption of commodities c and d, and labor
earnings y. The tax function must pass through the points {ci, di, yi} for i = 1, 2, 3;
and elsewhere must lie below the indifference curves through {ci, di, yi}. Given such
a tax schedule, individual i will clearly choose the point {ci, di, yi} . As in Marchand
et al. (2003), the tax system would consist of a combination of taxes/subsidies on
labor earnings and on commodity d. The tax schedule with non-linear income and
non-linear commodity taxes is Ti = T (yi) + t (di), where T (.) and t (.) are assumed
to be differentiable. Labor earnings are devoted to the consumption of commodities c
and d, and to the payment of income and commodity taxes. The following expressions
4n2 ≥ n3 is a sufficient, although not necessary, condition for this case to hold (see condition in
appendix B.1).
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provide the marginal tax rates on income and commodity d, respectively:
T 0 = 1− 1
wi
h0
µ
yi
wi
¶
,
t0 = v0
¡
di − di
¢
− 1.
3 Welfarist approach
We have just seen that for the problem at hand the non-welfarist approach we use can be
justified by the theory of responsibility. Furthermore it implies that in the second-best
solution the disabled could be induced to work less than the leisure-prone individuals.
Yet, many economists have some problems with such an approach. They tend
to prefer a welfarist approach wherein the disabled individuals would be given more
weight than the two other types of individuals. We turn to this approach and show
its implications in both the first- and second-best. The laissez-faire solution naturally
does not change. Regarding the first-best, the problem of the planner is expressed by
the following Lagrangian:
L =
3X
i=1
αiniG
£
ci + v
¡
di − d¯i
¢
− h (ci)
¤
+ µ
3X
i=1
ni (wi ci − ci − di) ,
where αi represents the weight given to individuals of type i. These weights are assumed
to be non-increasing with i.
The FOCs yield:
αiG
0
i = µ for all i,
v0
¡
d1 − d
¢
= v0 (d2) = v0 (d3) = 1 and thus d1 − d = d2 = d3,
h0 (c1)
wc
=
h0 (c2)
wc
=
h0 (c3)
wh
and thus c1 = c2 < c3.
The equations for d and c coincide with those obtained for the laissez-faire. In partic-
ular, disabled individuals are required to work the same amount as able ones. In order
to determine c, note that:
G0i =
λ
αi
for all i.
The higher the weight αi, the lower G0i and, since G (.) is concave, higher utility ci +
v
¡
di − d¯i
¢
− h (ci). When the social planner weighs more heavily the utility of the
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disabled individuals (i.e., α1 > α2),
c1 + v
¡
d1 − d¯1
¢
− h (c1) > c2 + v (d2)− h (c2) .
Since d1 − d¯1 = d2 and c1 = c2, we obtain c1 > c2.
This stems from the quasi-linear utility specification. The weight given to individual
1 is not reflected by a lower labor supply but by a higher level of consumption of good
c. With a more general separable utility function u (c) + v
¡
d− d¯
¢
− h (c), c1 would be
lower than c2.
It is worth noting that the Rawlsian criterion would amount to equalize the utilities
of the three types, with c1 = c2.
Turning to the second-best, the problem of the social planner can be expressed as
follows:
max
{ci,di,yi}
3X
i=1
αiniG
·
ci + v
¡
di − d¯i
¢
− h
µ
yi
wi
¶¸
s.t.
(µ) :
3X
i=1
ni (yi − ci − di) ≥ 0
(λi) : ci + v (di)− h
µ
yi
wi
¶
≥ ci−1 + v (di−1)− h
µ
yi−1
wi
¶
, i = 2, 3
(λ31) : c3 + v (d3)− h
µ
y3
wh
¶
≥ c1 + v (d1)− h
µ
y1
wh
¶
.
Rearranging the FOCs, given by equations (B.2.1) to (B.2.9) in appendix B, we obtain:
v0 (d3) = h0
µ
y3
wh
¶
1
wh
= 1, (10)
v0 (d2) =
λn2
α2n2G02 + λ2 − λ3
= 1, (11)
h0
µ
y2
wc
¶
= wc
·
1 +
λ3
α2n2G02 + λ2
µ
h0
µ
y2
wh
¶
1
wh
− 1
¶¸
≤ wc, (12)
v0
¡
d1 − d¯1
¢
− 1 = λ2 + λ31
α1n1G01
¡
v0 (d1)− 1
¢
, (13)
h0
µ
y1
wc
¶
= wc
·
1 +
λ31
α1n1G01 − λ2
µ
h0
µ
y1
wh
¶
1
wh
− 1
¶¸
≤ wc, (14)
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µ =
3P
i=1αiniG
0
i
3P
i=1ni
. (15)
As in the non-welfarist approach, the second-best levels of y3, d3 and d2 coincide with
the first-best ones. There is no efficiency gain in distorting the choices of the high-
productivity individuals, nor the choice of commodity d by the low-productivity able
individuals. However, it can be optimal to distort the labor choice of these individuals
if by doing so high-productivity individuals are precluded from mimicking them. As
before, the SSC that prevents type 3 from mimicking type 2 individuals is binding
and ySB2 < y
FB
2 . Regarding low-productivity disabled individuals, it is optimal to
distort their consumption of commodity d (i.e., dSB1 > d
FB
1 > d
FB
2 = d
FB
3 ). However,
in contrast with the non-welfarist approach, it is not always optimal to distort their
labor supply decision. It depends on whether there are incentives for high-productivity
individuals to mimic them (i.e., whether the SSC that prevents type 3 from mimicking
type 1 individuals is binding).
A further analysis of the pattern of SSCs - see appendix B.2 for more detail -
yields the following possibilities: either the three SSCs are simultaneously binding
and ySB1 = y
SB
2 < y
FB
2 = y
FB
1 , or both SSCs that prevent the high-productivity
individuals from mimicking both types of low-productivity individuals are binding,
with the adjacent SSC that relates both types of low-productivity individuals holding
with strict inequality. This latter case is only possible if yFB1 > y
SB
1 > y
SB
2 (i.e., among
the low-productivity individuals the disabled are required to work more than the able
ones). This is clearly at odds with the idea of alleviating the hardship of work for type
1 individuals.
Which one of these two regimes prevails? It will depend crucially on the para-
meters of the model (i.e., the degree of concavity of the social utility transformation
G (·), the proportion of different types in the population, the wage gap, the particular
weights given, etc.). It seems worthwhile to analyze two particular cases in further de-
tail: namely, the utilitarian and Rawlsian specifications. In the utilitarian case where
all αi are equal the two regimes mentioned above are indeed possible. However, for
the Rawlsian objective, which in this case corresponds to maximizing the utility of
the disabled individual, the SSC that prevents low-productivity able individuals from
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mimicking the disabled ones always binds and the only relevant possibility involves the
three SSCs binding, with ySB1 = y
SB
2 and, hence, c
SB
1 = c
SB
2 .
One interesting general result that emerges is that the weighted welfarist objective
is unable to provide solutions in which disabled individuals are required to work less
than their able counterparts, and they may indeed be required to work more. Disabled
will instead be compensated with larger amounts of commodity d, because this is the
only feature of their preferences a welfarist planner can use to distinguish them.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have dealt with the design of an optimal social policy in a setting where
different people have the same disutility for labor and thus in a laissez-faire economy
they would work the same amount of time if they have the same productivity. Yet,
the social planner would like to treat them differently because the labor disutility of
some reflects a stronger preference for leisure whereas that of others stems from some
physical or psychological pain from work.
The only way they can be distinguished is through their consumption basket that
indicates the nature of their labor disutility: disability here implies some particular
needs in consuming one of the goods. We consider two possible social criteria. One
consists of giving more weight to the utility of the disabled and it thus generates a
Paretian outcome. The other consists of giving more weight to the labor disutility of
the disabled and this yields a non-Paretian outcome.
We show that the non-welfarist approach can be justified by using the dichotomy
between characteristics of responsibility and characteristics of luck. Only the latter are
used for the sake of redistribution. We also show that the non-welfarist approach can
imply a lower labor supply requirement from disabled individuals whereas the welfarist
approach is unable to generate such an outcome, regardless of the higher weight given
to the utility of the disabled or the degree of concavity used to reflect redistributive
concerns.
11
References
[1] Bossert, and D. Van de Gaer (1999) Responsibility, talent and compensation: a
second-best analysis, Review of Economic Design, 4, 35-55.
[2] Cremer, H., J-M. Lozachmeur and P. Pestieau (2006), Disability testing and re-
tirement, CORE DP 2006/16.
[3] Fleurbaey, M. and F. Maniquet (2005a), Fair income tax, Review of Economic
Studies, forthcoming.
[4] Fleurbaey, M. and F. Maniquet (2005b), Help the low-skilled or let the hardworking
thrive? A study of fairness in optimal income taxation, mimeo.
[5] Kanbur, R., J. Puttila and M. Tuomala (2006), Non welfarist optimal taxation
and behavioral public economics, Journal of Economic Surveys, 20, 849-868.
[6] Marchand, M., Pestieau, P. and M. Racionero (2003), Optimal Redistribution
when Different Workers are Indistinguishable, Canadian Journal of Economics
36, 911-922.
[7] Mirrlees, J. (1971), An exploration in the theory of optimal taxation, Review of
Economic Studies, 38, 175-208.
[8] O’Donoghue, T. and M. Rabin (2003), Studying optimal paternalism, illustrated
by a model of sin taxes, American Economic Review, 93, 186-191.
[9] Roemer, J. (1996), Theories of Distributive Justice, Harvard University Press.
[10] Stiglitz, J. (1982). Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation, Journal of Public
Economics 17, 213-240.
[11] Schokkaert, E., D. Van de Gaer, F. Vandenbroucke and R. Luttens (2006), Respon-
sibility sensitive egalitarianism and optimal linear taxation, Mathematical Social
Sciences, 48, 151-182.
12
A Relevant self-selection constraints
When relevant information about some individual characteristics is private, the social
planner needs to take account of the so-called self-selection constraints. These con-
straints are incorporated in order to prevent individuals of a given type from applying
for the tax-treatment designed for individuals of other types. The purpose of this sec-
tion is to identify which SSCs need to be incorporated in the second-best problem. If
the social objective involves redistribution towards the bottom we need only focus on
downwards SSCs:
c3 + v (d3)− h
µ
y3
wh
¶
≥ c2 + v (d2)− h
µ
y2
wh
¶
, (A.1)
c2 + v (d2)− h
µ
y2
wc
¶
≥ c1 + v (d1)− h
µ
y1
wc
¶
, (A.2)
c3 + v (d3)− h
µ
y3
wh
¶
≥ c1 + v (d1)− h
µ
y1
wh
¶
. (A.3)
The first two constraints are the adjacent downwards SSCs (for i = 3, 2), whereas the
last SSC is the non-adjacent one that relates individuals of types 3 and 1.
In most of the analysis of optimal non-linear income taxation, with social objectives
that redistribute towards the bottom, the adjacent downwards SSCs are sufficient.
However, it is necessary to check whether this is the case in the present framework,
given the complexity added by the existence of differential needs for commodity d.
From (A.1) and (A.2),
c3 + v (d3)− c1 − v (d1) ≥ h
µ
y3
wh
¶
− h
µ
y2
wh
¶
+ h
µ
y2
wc
¶
− h
µ
y1
wc
¶
.
If
h
µ
y2
wc
¶
− h
µ
y1
wc
¶
≥ h
µ
y2
wh
¶
− h
µ
y1
wh
¶
,
then (A.3) holds (Note this is a sufficient condition). Given the properties of the
disutility of labor function h (.) (in particular, h0 > 0, h00 ≥ 0) and wh > wc,
h
µ
y2
wc
¶
− h
µ
y1
wc
¶
≥ h
µ
y2
wh
¶
− h
µ
y1
wh
¶
iff y2 ≥ y1, and (A.3), the downwards SSC that relates non-adjacent individuals of
types 3 and 1, holds. However, it is worthwhile emphasizing that it is possible that
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y1 > y2 if the combination of (c, d) for a type 1 individual is such that the social planner
can ask her to work harder than a type 2, in order to prevent type 2 individuals from
mimicking type 1 individuals, and compensate her with larger amount of d, which a
type 2 individual values relatively less. If y1 > y2,
h
µ
y3
wh
¶
− h
µ
y2
wh
¶
+ h
µ
y2
wc
¶
− h
µ
y1
wc
¶
< h
µ
y3
wh
¶
− h
µ
y1
wh
¶
.
It might still be possible that (A.3) is satisfied, except when (A.1) and (A.2) bind. In
this case,
u (c3)+v (d3)−u (c1)−v (d1) = h
µ
y3
wh
¶
−h
µ
y2
wh
¶
+h
µ
y2
wc
¶
−h
µ
y1
wc
¶
< h
µ
y3
wh
¶
−h
µ
y1
wh
¶
and (A.3) is violated. In view of this we need to incorporate the three SSCs in the
formal second-best problem to make the mimicking behavior unattractive.5
B Analysis of the pattern of self-selection constraints
B.1 Non-welfarist objective
The FOCs of the social planner problem with the non-welfarist objective used in this
paper are:
n1G01 − λd2 − λd31 = λn1 (B.1.1)
n2G
0
2 + λ
d
2 − λd3 = λn2 (B.1.2)
n3G03 + λ
d
3 + λ
d
31 = λn3 (B.1.3)
v0
¡
d1 − d¯1
¢ ¡
n1G
0
1
¢
−
³
λd2 + λ
d
31
´
v0 (d1) = λn1 (B.1.4)
v0 (d2)
³
n2G02 + λ
d
2 − λd3
´
= λn2 (B.1.5)
v0 (d3)
³
n3G
0
3 + λ
d
3 + λ
d
31
´
= λn3 (B.1.6)
h0
µ
y1
wc
¶
1
wc
³
βn1G
0
1 − λd2
´
− λd31h0
µ
y1
wh
¶
1
wh
= λn1 (B.1.7)
h0
µ
y2
wc
¶
1
wc
³
n2G02 + λ
d
2
´
− λd3h0
µ
y2
wh
¶
1
wh
= λn2 (B.1.8)
5Marchand et al. (2003) focus on solutions in which the handicapped individuals are induced to work
less than the lazy ones. In those circumstances, y2 > y1 and only the adjacent downwards SSCs are
binding. For consistency, we incorporate the three downwards SSCs, including the non-adjacent that
relates individuals of types 3 and 1, for all the objectives considered and highlight the circumstances
under which the non-adjacent constraint is indeed redundant.
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h0
µ
y3
wh
¶
1
wh
³
n3G03 + λ
d
3 + λ
d
31
´
= λn3 (B.1.9)
Rearranging these conditions the second-best (hereafter SB) is characterized by equa-
tions (4) to (9) in the text. From (B.1.1) to (B.1.3), it follows that:
λ2 + λ31 ≥ 0⇔ G01 ≥ λ⇔ G01 ≥
n2G02 + n3G03
n2 + n3
,
λ3 + λ31 ≥ 0⇔ λ ≥ G03 ⇔ G03 ≤
n1G01 + n2G02,
n1 + n2
G02 >
n1G01 + n3G03
n1 + n3
⇔ G02 > λ⇔ λ3 − λ2 > 0⇒ λ3 > 0 and λ2 ≥ 0,
G02 <
n1G01 + n3G03
n1 + n3
⇔ G02 < λ⇔ λ3 − λ2 < 0⇒ λ2 > 0 and λ3 ≥ 0.
Moreover, the SSCs - equations (A.1) to (A.3) in appendix A - imply that:
u3 > u2 > u1 > eu1 → G01 > G02 > G03.
Hence,
G01 >
n2G02 + n3G03
n2 + n3
→ G01 > λ→ λ2 + λ31 > 0
G03 <
n1G01 + n2G02
n1 + n2
→ λ > G03 → λ3 + λ31 > 0
which means that either SSC 216 and SSC 31 are binding, or SSC 21 and SSC 32 are
binding, or SSC 31 and SSC 32 are binding, or the three constraint are binding. We
hereafter analyze these possibilities in turn.
1. If SSC 32 and SSC 21 are binding, then λ3 > 0 and λ2 > 0. If y2 > y1, the SSC
31 holds with strict inequality. If y1 > y2, the SSC 31 is violated. In contrast
to the weighted welfarist objective below, the SB equations (6) and (8) do not
imply a clear-cut relationship between y1 and y2: either y1 > y2 (then the SSC
31 is violated) or y2 > y1. Using (6) and (8)
y2 ≥ y1 ⇔
λ3
n2G02 + λ2
µ
1− h0
µ
y2
wh
¶
1
wh
¶
≤ n1G
0
1 (β − 1)
βn1G01 − λ2
.
6We employ this notation for short in the appendix. SSC ij means the self-selection that prevents
a type i individual from mimicking a type j individual, where i 6= j. SSC 32, SSC 21 and SSC 31 are
given by equations (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3), respectively.
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Note that y2 > y1 is now possible because β > 1. Using (B.1.1) to (B.1.3), the
equation can be rewritten as:
y2 ≥ y1 ⇔
G01(β−1)
G01(β−1)+λ
(λ−G03)
(λ−G03)+λ
n2
n3
≥ 1− h0
µ
y2
wh
¶
1
wh
.
Note that if
G01(β−1)
G01(β−1)+λ
(λ−G03)
(λ−G03)+λ
n2
n3
≥ 1,
then the condition holds and y2 > y1. Rearranging,
G01 (β − 1)
λ−G03
≥ G
0
1 (β − 1) + λ
(λ−G03) + λn2n3
.
If n2 ≥ n3, the sufficient condition holds. If n2 < n3, then the sufficient condition
does not hold but it might still be possible that the overall condition for y2 > y1
holds.
2. If SSC 21 and SSC 31 are binding, then λ2 > 0 and λ31 > 0. If y1 > y2, the SSC
32 holds with strict inequality. However, if y2 > y1, the SSC 32 is violated. The
SB equations (6) and (8) imply that y2 > y1 for λ31 > 0 and λ3 = 0. Hence, this
pattern of SSCs is not possible because the SSC 32 is violated.
3. If SSC 32 and SSC 31 are binding, then λ3 > 0 and λ31 > 0. If y1 > y2, the SSC
21 holds with strict inequality. However, if y2 > y1, the SSC 21 is violated. From
SB equations (6) and (8) it is possible that y1 > y2. Working with (6) and (8),
and using (B.1.1) and (B.1.2), we obtain:
y1 > y2 ⇔
(G02 − λ)
G02
µ
1− h0
µ
y2
wh
¶
1
wh
¶
>
G01 (β − 1)
βG01
+
(G01 − λ)
βG01
µ
1− h0
µ
y1
wh
¶
1
wh
¶
.
4. If the three constraints are binding, then λ3 > 0, λ2 > 0 and λ31 > 0. The three
constraints can only be binding simultaneously if y1 = y2 = y. I.e.,
λ3
n2G02 + λ2
µ
1− h0
µ
y
wh
¶
1
wh
¶
=
n1G01 (β − 1) + λ31
³
1− h0
³
y
wh
´
1
wh
´
βn1G01 − λ2
.
Using (B.1.1) and (B.1.2) and rearranging,·
n1G01 (β − 1) + λn1
βn1G01 − λ2
− λn2
n2G02 + λ2
¸µ
1− h0
µ
y
wh
¶
1
wh
¶
=
n1G01 (β − 1)
βn1G01 − λ2
.
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Summing up, there are three possibilities: (i) either the three SSCs are binding and
ySB1 = y
SB
2 < y
FB
2 = y
FB
1 , or (ii) the SSCs that prevent high-productivity individuals
from mimicking both low-productivity ones are binding, with the downwards SSC that
relates both low-productivity individuals holding with strict inequality, and yFB1 >
ySB1 > y
SB
2 , or (iii) the adjacent downwards SSCs are binding, with the non-adjacent
downwards SSC holding with strict inequality, and ySB2 > y
SB
1 .
B.2 Weighted welfarist objective
The FOCs of the social planner problem with a weighted welfarist objective, assuming
non-increasing weights, are:
α1n1G01 − λ2 − λ31 = λn1, (B.2.1)
α2n2G
0
2 + λ2 − λ3 = λn2, (B.2.2)
α3n3G
0
3 + λ3 + λ31 = λn3, (B.2.3)
v0
¡
d1 − d¯1
¢ ¡
α1n1G
0
1
¢
− (λ2 + λ31) v0 (d1) = λn1, (B.2.4)
v0 (d2)
¡
α2n2G02 + λ2 − λ3
¢
= λn2, (B.2.5)
v0 (d3)
¡
α3n3G03 + λ3 + λ31
¢
= λn3, (B.2.6)
h0
µ
y1
wc
¶
1
wc
¡
α1n1G01 − λ2
¢
− λ31h0
µ
y1
wh
¶
1
wh
= λn1, (B.2.7)
h0
µ
y2
wc
¶
1
wc
¡
α2n2G02 + λ2
¢
− λ3h0
µ
y2
wh
¶
1
wh
= λn2, (B.2.8)
h0
µ
y3
wh
¶
1
wh
¡
α3n3G03 + λ3 + λ31
¢
= λn3. (B.2.9)
Rearranging these conditions the SB is characterized by equations (10) to (15) in the
text. From (B.2.1) to (B.2.3), it follows that:
λ2 + λ31 ≥ 0⇔ α1G01 ≥ λ⇔ α1G01 ≥
n2α2G02 + n3α3G03
n2 + n3
,
λ3 + λ31 ≥ 0⇔ λ ≥ α3G03 ⇔ α3G03 ≤
n1α1G01 + n2α2G02
n1 + n2
,
α2G02 >
n1α1G01 + n3α3G03
n1 + n3
⇔ α2G02 > λ⇔ λ3 − λ2 > 0⇒ λ3 > 0 and λ2 ≥ 0,
α2G
0
2 <
n1α1G01 + n3α3G03
n1 + n3
⇔ α2G02 < λ⇔ λ3 − λ2 < 0⇒ λ2 > 0 and λ3 ≥ 0.
17
In this case, the SSCs - equations (A.1) to (A.3) in appendix A - imply that
u3 > u2 > u1 → G01 > G02 > G03.
Hence, when the weights are non-increasing,
α1G01 >
n2α2G02 + n3α3G03
n2 + n3
→ α1G01 > λ→ λ2 + λ31 > 0,
α3G03 <
n1G01 + n2G02
n1 + n2
→ λ > α3G03 → λ3 + λ31 > 0,
which means, as in the previous case, that either SSC 21 and SSC 31 are binding,
or SSC 21 and SSC 32 are binding, or SSC 31 and SSC 32 are binding, or the three
constraint are binding. We again analyze these possibilities in turn.
1. If SSC 32 and SSC 21 are binding, then λ3 > 0 and λ2 > 0. If y2 > y1, the SSC
31 holds with strict inequality. However, if y1 > y2, the SSC 31 is violated. The
SB equations (12) and (14) imply that y1 > y2 for λ3 > 0 and λ31 = 0. Hence,
this pattern of SSCs is not possible because the SSC 31 is violated.
2. If SSC 21 and SSC 31 are binding, then λ2 > 0 and λ31 > 0. If y1 > y2, the SSC
32 holds with strict inequality. However, if y2 > y1, the SSC 32 is violated. The
SB equations (12) and (14) imply y2 > y1 for λ31 > 0 and λ3 = 0. Hence, this
pattern of SSCs is not possible because the SSC 32 is violated.
3. If SSC 32 and SSC 31 are binding, then λ3 > 0 and λ31 > 0. If y1 > y2, the SSC
21 holds with strict inequality. However, if y2 > y1, the SSC 21 is violated. From
SB equations (12) and (14) it is possible that y1 > y2. Working with (12) and
(14), and using (B.2.1) and (B.2.2), we obtain:
y1 > y2 ⇔
(α2G02 − λ)
α2G02
µ
1− h0
µ
y2
wh
¶
1
wh
¶
>
(α1G01 − λ)
α1G01
µ
1− h0
µ
y1
wh
¶
1
wh
¶
.
4. If the three constraints are binding, then λ3 > 0, λ2 > 0 and λ31 > 0. The three
constraints can only be binding simultaneously if y1 = y2 = y. I.e.,
λ3
α2n2G02 + λ2
=
λ31
α1n1G01 − λ2
.
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Summing up, there are only two possibilities now: (i) either the three SSCs are
simultaneously binding and ySB1 = y
SB
2 < y
FB
2 = y
FB
1 , or (ii) both SSCs that prevent
the high-productivity individuals from mimicking both types of low-productivity indi-
viduals are binding, with the adjacent SSC that relates both types of low-productivity
individuals holding with strict inequality. This last case is only possible if yFB1 > y
SB
1 >
ySB2 .
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